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In a complex, global economy, firms seek a range of mechanisms for addressing reg-
ulatory and social movement pressures. This requires an evolution beyond our cur-
rent models of response to regulation and control. This paper offers ideas on
collaborative control and industry self-regulation as alternative mechanisms for
addressing regulatory complexity. It explores a range of self-regulatory practices
worldwide, proposes a framework for examining its use, potential and limits, and
discusses the critical role of third-party organisations in the process. 
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vents over the last decade demonstrate the interconnectedness of
the global economy. Consider the domino effect of the US credit crisis on banks
and financial institutions in Europe and Asia. Witness the impacts of protests
during the last five World Trade Organisation talks (labour and environmental
policy), controversies over immigration policies across Europe and North Amer-
ica, multiple food and product safety incidents, and growing challenges to intellectual
property rights and rules. Executives and policy-makers recognise we are in a more inter-
dependent and complex world. We are noticing pressure on the global ‘commons’
(Ostrom 1990). 
In response, firm-level strategy has migrated beyond economic interests to include
sociopolitical issues (Mahon and McGowan 1998). An executive’s perspective is increas-
ingly global, cross-organisational and network-oriented: from supply chains to strategic
alliances and from public affairs management to public–private partnerships (Parkhe
et al. 2006; Waddock 1991). Recognising the need for product market strategies, con-
tingency plans (Raynor 2007) and issues management, firms are more proactively
involved in stakeholder management (Freeman 1984; Mitchell et al. 1997), public affairs
and political strategy (Mahon and Griffin 1999; Griffin and Dunn 2004), and corporate
citizenship initiatives (Waddock 2004). As with outsourcing to experts to meet critical
business needs, firms are experimenting with a variety of institutional mechanisms to
address regulatory and social issues. Additionally, traditional civil society institutions
such as trade associations and professional societies are helping to create new watch-
dog and reporting entities (e.g. Global Reporting Initiative) that address the ‘commons’
challenge. 
Complex technologies, interdependence and globalisation require us to look at gov-
ernance mechanisms, standards and rules in different, perhaps more dynamist ways
(Ostrom 1990; Postrel 1998). The control systems which emerged in more placid and
stable environments included hierarchical and bureaucratic mechanisms such as leg-
islation, litigation and the judicial process. The ‘commons’ was policed for the most part
by government entities and institutions (Barnett and King 2008). But these regulatory
mechanisms are not well equipped to cope with the novel and unanticipated conse-
quences of the new levels of interdependence (Trist 1983). Adaptability is often enhanced
if organisations are able to move towards a negotiated order in which they acknowledge
their interdependence and take the purposes of other organisations into account (Emery
and Trist 1973). 
The purpose of this paper is to describe and define industry self-regulation, particu-
larly with respect to the role of third-party organisations, and to offer examples of cur-
rent systems and to explore new opportunities and areas to consider. In the broadest
sense, self-regulation is an alternative form of governance: the decision over who decides
what behaviours, rules or standards are appropriate and how to enforce those rules. Yet
we recognise it is a response to some failure in a market (e.g. standards, professional
conduct, etc.) or a need to control a marketplace inefficiency not addressed by current
institutions. Finally, it is a process, a search for a balance that government, business and
civil society institutions such as trade associations, professional associations and watch-
dog organisations work out over time. 
The literature 
Before delving directly into the literature on self-regulation, we must step back for a
moment. The major theme guiding our inquiry is a search for appropriate institutional
arrangements—formal and informal (North 1990)—to address marketplace inefficien-
E
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cies and regulate business behaviours in a complex environment. For particular types
of behaviour, are there alternative means to achieve the ends intended by regulation? A
priori, we should examine our notions of governance and control. At the extremes, it is
either centrally controlled by an outside party (e.g. the state), or it is self-organised, self-
policed and self-sanctioned. But what about the many cases that fall between these
extremes? In some domains such as resource sharing, we see evidence where strict
reliance on centralised command and control has given way to participation, stakeholder
dialogue and decentralisation (Ostrom 1990). In the broadest sense, governance as a
form of control has extended beyond attention to internal organisation systems to
include the management of external relationships and stakeholders (Williamson 1996;
Monks and Minow 1996) via various institutional arrangements. At the firm level, being
explicit about values, while integrating environmental and stakeholder interests, is at
the heart of corporate citizenship (Waddock 2004). Evidence of network-level gover-
nance is apparent in entities such as Waddell’s (2003) global action networks as well as
in signatory agreements such as the UN Global Compact. 
Recent work in regulation has focused on institutional structures (McCraw 1984;
Williamson 1985; Getz 1995), compliance (Mitnick 1980), reform (Breyer 1982) and
variation (Harris and Carman 1987). Some attention is given to evaluating the deregu-
lation of airlines, telecommunications and trucking industries, and to suggesting alter-
native institutional mechanisms such as self-regulation and stakeholder regulation
(Gupta and Lad 1983; Lad 1991). Barnett and King (2008) present a detailed analysis of
self-regulation and its evolution over the last two decades in a range of settings from
brewing, to forestry, to the Responsible Care initiative in the chemical industry. Rees
(1997) and King et al. (2005) have suggested the value of self-regulation particularly in
the environmental area and have noted the critical importance of third-party associa-
tions and institutions. They note that the process is more collaborative. Austrom and
Lad (1989) would argue that firms and third-party institutions are adapting to the tur-
bulent environment. 
As issues of product safety and quality have entered trade discussions, and country-
to-country differences in standards such as pharmaceutical testing and accounting have
made headlines, it is clear that a more critical examination of appropriate mechanisms
for global regulation is occurring. A recurrent issue in discussions in Brussels for the
European Economic Community (EEC 92) has centred on the cooperative design of
processes for setting and enforcing rules and standards. These processes are referred
to in traditional terms such as collective action (Olson 1965), collective strategy (Astley
and Fombrun 1983), cooperation (Schermerhorn 1979), transorganisational systems
(Cummings 1984), issues management alliances (Austrom and Lad 1989) or catalytic
organisations (Waddock 1991). Entities both traditional (associations) and new are tak-
ing action to secure the ‘commons’, manage social issues or address a problem unman-
ageable with current mechanisms. 
A framework for examining regulation 
The themes from the literature suggest that control has shifted to include involvement
of those being controlled, the use of collaboration to address issues that were not served
by organisations going it alone, and the trend in regulation to consider appropriate insti-
tutional arrangements and representative parties when designing regulatory systems. 
Figure 1 provides a perspective on regulatory policies and where opportunities for
self-regulation or cooperative regulation might be considered. The horizontal axis is a
spectrum from low to high of business involvement in regulation; the vertical axis rep-
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resents the scale from high to low of government involvement. Traditional direct regu-
lation would fall in the lower left cell (cell III), and basic self-regulation would appear
in the upper right cell (cell II). Deregulation and market rule fall into the upper left cell
(cell I). The lower right cell (cell IV)—high government involvement and high business
involvement—is the domain for collaborative control. 
This paper focuses primarily on cells II and IV. In the former, the case of basic self-
regulation, government involvement is low. The salience of regulatory failure is low. Yet
business involvement is high. The reputation of the industry or profession is at stake.
A third-party organisation steps up to impose order. In the latter case, cell IV, both busi-
ness and government are involved. Typically, these are high-risk industries where
processes are complex and issues of safety are critical. Both parties recognise the need
to work together. 
Two points are critical. First, many examples of social regulation entail some shared
responsibility for the regulatory process. Of major importance to business is involve-
ment in the various hearings processes prior to legislation, and in discussions of nec-
essary enforcement procedures. Second, cell IV depicts those regulatory areas in which
both business and government work together. Consistent with commentary by Chatov
(1978) and Schultz (1985) on business–government cooperation, the issues arising here
simply require the expertise of industry and the oversight of government. In addition,
if the regulatory design pattern being established in Brussels is replicated, it is here that
international regulatory issues will fall. 
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Figure 1 government and industry involvement in the regulatory system: the distinctions
between direct regulation, self-regulation and cooperative regulation 
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Self-regulation, collaborative control and third party organisations 
The traditional approach to control of improper business behaviour in the US and other
developed countries is direct regulation by government. Laws are passed and agencies,
commissions and courts are organised to carry them out. Government via courts and
administrative structures is the mechanism or means through which social control is
established and exercised. Yet, in some instances, namely areas of high business and
high government involvement (cell IV), alternatives to total government involvement
are possible and, in fact, necessary. We have government-sanctioned and -endorsed sys-
tems of industry and/or professional groups who shape standards, impose rules and
certify and license professionals by themselves (cell II). Additionally, we have those areas
(cell IV) where business and government have high involvement and need to collabo-
rate in the process. 
Self-regulation is a regulatory process in which an industry-level organisation (such
as a trade association or professional society) sets and enforces rules and standards relat-
ing to the conduct of firms as well as individuals in the industry. The system is charac-
terised by rule making/standards setting, monitoring and enforcement stages. In some
low-risk areas (hairdresser and real estate licensing; CPA [certified public accountant]
certification) the profession works on its own. More typically, committees within third-
party organisations such as industry associations or professional societies propose stan-
dards and request government approval through advisory opinions. If the process is
collaborative, it can reduce the chances of antitrust claims based on restraint of trade.
Monitoring and enforcement procedures are set up to encourage problem resolution
within the system before referring the case to government. Often, government serves
as the enforcer of last resort (Lad 1992; Rees 1997; King et al. 2005). 
Self-regulation takes on a variety of forms designed to address particular issues: for
example, technical standards, credentialling, accreditation and codes of ethics. As we
see in biotechnology safety and stock exchange trading (cell IV), business and govern-
ment are partners in the responsibility for policy-making and enforcement. In some
cases, government asks for help. In others, the trade group or profession sees an oppor-
tunity to be involved. Evidence from a range of examples in the US, Canada, Europe and
Australia suggests that in some areas—motion picture ratings, advertising content, per-
fume standards, hairdresser licensing—government encourages the industry to set
standards and provides only limited oversight (cell II). In others, such as power plant
safety and drug testing, government needs industry expertise and sets up mechanisms
for working together. One way to visualise the variety of forms and the overlap across
sectors is demonstrated in Figure 2. 
The market–hierarchy–clan model has its roots in work by Lindblom (1977),
Williamson (1975) and Ouchi (1980). Williamson’s early work depicted markets and
bureaucracies as systems for allocating resources in society. As such, they serve as rule-
making systems. In the market, rules of supply, demand and pricing determine how
goods and services are allocated. In bureaucracies, administrative structures, policies
and procedures serve the resource allocation role. Marketplace rules or incentive, price,
exchange and opportunism are tempered by the need to control inefficiencies, discour-
age collusion and provide services when marketplace rules would not work. Hence,
bureaucracies such as natural monopolies, agencies providing public goods and regu-
latory structures are created. 
Ouchi’s concept of the clan suggests another dimension or domain for rule making
and resource allocation. These are the formal institutions in civil society—churches,
political groups, associations and advocacy organisations. Like a family, political con-
stituency or interest group, or highly homogeneous organisation, a clan develops an
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identity, establishes shared values and has rules for how resources are distributed and
decisions made. A rite of passage, socialisation or apprenticeship may be required for
acceptance. 
Each domain is a system for allocating resources and monitoring behaviour. Yet the
systems are not independent. They rely on oversight from the other domains. As shown
in Figure 2, many examples of collaborative control show up at the boundaries or inter-
faces between these domains. 
The three-dimensional figure offers the domains (business, government, third sec-
tor) to take into account as we think about maintaining social order in complex systems.
With the new complexity, no single system is sufficient. It requires a combination of
lawrence j. lad and craig b. caldwell 
72 JCC 35 Autumn 2009
A. Market
B. Resource acquisition/allocation
C. Rational actor
D. Autonomy pooled
A. Bureaucracy
B. Regulation/control
C. Organisational systems/politics
D. Centralisation/central
A. Clan
B. Constituency
C. Individual politics
D. Coordination/reciprocal
Public–private
partnership
QWL programmes
Self-managed teams
Professional 
standards
Technical
standards
Financial disclosure
rules
Personal
support groups
Governance structure
Bureaucratic order
Organisation, capacity, legal legitimacy
Marketplace rule
Economic incentive
Clan
Political capacity, traditions
Code of ethics
Legend
A = Types of rules and allocation 
  systems: Williamson 1985; Ouchi 
  1980
B = Policy types: Lowi 1967
C = Policy dimensions and processes: 
  Allison 1971
D = Organisation/systems design: 
  Keidel 1995; Thompson 1967; 
  Galbraith 1973
Figure 2 context for collaboration and control: theoretical roots and examples 
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market (business), state (government) and community (third sector) mechanisms work-
ing together. Boddewyn (1989) notes that the overlap between self-regulation and other
forms of social control is necessary to the extent that a good part of the law reflects gen-
erally accepted community and market standards. Self-regulation’s complementary role,
therefore, should be conceived not only in terms of developing and applying additional
norms, but also in reinforcing those norms emanating from community, market and
state. This is consistent with Manz and Sims (1986), who suggest that in advanced soci-
eties the notion of self-control is a requisite norm for individuals, professionals and
organisations. 
Industry self-regulation is an example of both inter-firm and multi-sector collabora-
tion. Typically, the initial choice is inter-firm collaboration to self-police in the early
stages of designing the rule-making system; later it is multi-sector collaboration between
business and government to monitor and enforce rules that becomes more prevalent.
As noted in Hallstrom (2004), the life-cycle of a self-regulatory system often begins with
a fairly successful single-country example, typically the US, Canada, Australia or the
European Union (EU), which evolves into a more global code. Regardless of where it is
in the life-cycle, the process involves an inter-organisational network (i.e. a trade asso-
ciation or professional society as opposed to a government agency) that sets and enforces
rules and standards relating to the conduct of firms as well as individuals in the indus-
try (Gupta and Lad 1983). As an innovation, self-regulation signifies a movement away
from strictly adversarial relations between business and government. 
Numerous examples in such industries as direct selling, bill collection and home
appliances show evidence of cooperative and coalescing strategies for managing envi-
ronment uncertainty (Lad 1991). 
Institutions and third-party organisations 
Industry self-regulation operates on the premise that the transaction costs of designing,
securing government approval and operating a system of self-control are lower than if
government imposes control externally. The presence of a bona fide self-regulatory sys-
tem signifies that at some level both government and industry recognise their shared
responsibility to address problems and issues without resorting to lengthy court battles.
Additionally, it shows that, with the necessary checks, industry competitors can collab-
orate on quality standards and other rules of competition without unfair restriction of
trade. 
In self-regulation, the process of generating support from industry members and gov-
ernment regulators requires collaboration. The primary responsibility for formulation
and enforcement of regulatory standards rests with an industry self-regulatory body (e.g.
an association) rather than a government agency. Associations and professional soci-
eties play numerous roles in the process. An ongoing, problem-solving relationship
exists between the regulatory agency and the industry self-regulating body. Some exam-
ples are shown in Table 1, with detailed descriptions of additional examples offered
below. 
Financial services industry 
The licensing of securities brokers and the stock exchanges is managed outside gov-
ernment. While the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and its counterparts
abroad have the responsibility to enforce rules about fraud and insider trading, they rely
on insiders to self-police improper behaviours. Consider, for example, the linkages
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between the SEC, the stock exchanges and the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers (NASD). The regulatory mosaic represented in the licensing of stock traders using
tests created by the NASD, the policing of practices by the exchanges, and the strict
enforcement of rules by the SEC illustrates the collaboration that is fundamental to the
execution of hundreds of thousands of trades each day. The responsiveness to the pub-
lic crisis of confidence after the October 1987 crash in restricting programme trading
was truly a cooperative effort. In contrast to a top-down, command-and-control process
by the SEC, a ‘negotiated order’ was created in a dialogue between the SEC, NASD, the
trading houses and the exchanges. In general, the government regulator performs an
oversight role, may share monitoring and enforcement responsibilities, and can
threaten to impose more severe direct regulation should self-regulation prove ineffec-
tive. Parallels can be found in the Investment Dealers Association and the Futures Indus-
try Association 
Broadcasting and media 
In the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, broadcasters are subject to federal over-
sight and licensing rules yet they monitor advertising content through mechanisms sim-
ilar to Better Business Bureaus and National Advertising Review Boards. The direct
marketing industry also self-regulates. 
Chemical industry 
The Responsible Care initiative is a voluntary code of conduct for firms in the handling
and labelling of products. Research has explored the role of key trade associations in the
process (Lenox and Nash 2003; King and Lenox 2000). The environmental practice area
is a major domain for international self-regulation. 
Internet 
The Internet crosses international boundaries and represents an important opportunity
for self-regulation or co-regulation on an international scale. The Internet is a globally
fragmented industry with a technology that is growing in exposure geometrically. Fur-
ther, it is only partially understood by those responsible for legislation. Calls by govern-
ment for industry involvement in standards over privacy and security are evident in both
Europe and the US. While initial technical standards in regulating HTML and XML lan-
guages on the Internet were developed democratically, the self-regulatory process in
issues of encryption, privacy and taxation have not been as promising (Rothenbueller
1998). Not only are a number of US and international regulatory bodies vying for juris-
diction, over 11 by one account, but no major trade group has emerged to mobilise the
industry. Despite a recent FTC (Federal Trade Commission) sweep of 1,200 websites
checking their privacy policy, the urgency to act has not hit the critical stage. This area
represents a decisive opportunity for international cooperative policy with a mix of mar-
ketplace issues, technology expertise, consumer concerns and oversight organisations
all in the dialogue (Ahlert et al. 2003; Varney 1998).
Accounting profession 
The AICPA (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) and its international
counterparts have explored ways to expand the role of accounting beyond tax and audit
services into other areas. The AICPA has considered ways to utilise the profession’s exper-
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tise at attestation to expand their reach. Attestation is essentially the process of author-
itatively certifying or documenting that a procedure or a process was carried out accord-
ing to a specified set of rules. For example, an audit essentially attests that the process
of assembling and disclosing financial statements is done properly. Examples of areas
in which the AICPA has offered its services include the WEB/TRUST certification given
to safe websites and the certification of long-term healthcare facilities. This role repre-
sents a monitoring function critical in successful self-regulation. The objectivity of the
profession may be an essential element in designing new systems. 
The limits of self-regulation 
Important distinctions and caveats to the idea of self-regulation and collaborative regu-
lation should be noted. First, self-regulation is one choice among a variety of institu-
tional mechanisms: for example, government ownership, direct regulation and stake-
holder regulation (Gupta and Lad 1983). With few exceptions, opportunities for
self-regulation are limited to the standards-setting arena. Government would not
endorse any form of collusion over prices or territories, nor would they let industry set
rules where the salience of regulatory failure is high (food safety, drug testing). The bet-
ter opportunities for self-regulation may be in those areas where it can complement
other regulatory systems (e.g. stock market trading). The workability of the system is
subject to the political power of the association or larger firms within the industry. 
Second, as with any public policy, the intended ends may not be realised by everyone.
For example, advantage taking by the more powerful organisations (free-riders) in a net-
work and symbolic self-policing (e.g. TV evangelists) may still occur. To date, the antitrust
rules have been useful in addressing the more blatant abuses, and serve as a deterrent
to others considering only symbolic standards. To be sure, the prevalence of court rul-
ings on ‘per se’ criteria versus ‘reasonableness’ criteria may reduce the number of organ-
isations considering self-regulation for fear of an antitrust scrutiny. 
Third, as with regulation in general, self-regulation takes on a variety of forms each
designed to address a particular issue: technical standards, credentialing, accreditation
and codes of ethics. Yet the term ‘self’-regulation may be a misnomer in that the process
frequently involves government. At minimum, government offers tacit approval by let-
ting professions and industries set standards (e.g. motion pictures, nursing specialities)
on their own. More often, however, government and industry work together to design a
‘system’ for establishing and amending rules, monitoring and sanctioning inappropri-
ate behaviour. As we move into new technologies, such as biotech, and global indus-
tries, such as financial services, cooperative and self-regulation needs to be considered
as a legitimate complement to the system of direct control. 
The future 
The assumption behind this paper is that, in some selected areas, a collaborative
approach to regulation may be more efficient and effective than the typical command-
and-control approach. As complexity grows, a more open or dynamist system for rules
may be more appropriate. Postrel’s (1998) discussion of the dynamist rules system has
significant application to standards in electronic commerce and biotech safety where
basic protocols can leave room for adaptation, accept criticism and still protect ‘the com-
mons’. Regardless of the choice of mechanism, the essence of the process will entail
collaboration. 
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Proactive
The days of treating issues management in regulation as an afterthought are over.
Regulatory issues and their management cannot wait until after the core operations of the
business have been secured. Managers must proactively consider their partnership in a
three-way relationship between their industry, civil society and government. Rather than
wait for a call from a regulator or third-party NGO, managers should initiate these
conversations. Given the current environment, they will probably find both parties
receptive and eager to work collaboratively.
Perspective 
We encourage managers to consider their role in the traditional activities of regulation
making, monitoring and enforcement. While these activities have and will continue to
occur, managers have the opportunity to take a larger role in all facets of these activities.
As noted previously, we are concerned with meaningful regulation that promotes
accountability and transparency. We suggest that managers can exchange greater levels of
accountability and transparency for a greater voice in the process.
Participate 
Traditionally, firms have largely been relegated to lobbying and litigation roles in
regulation. If firms hope to break this model, it will necessitate levels and types of
participation from management that have seldom been seen. In the new self-regulation
model, managers have the chance to co-design regulation. In order to accomplish this,
firms will need to develop a greater role on the executive team for those that specialise in
regulatory aspects of the firm. These specialists will need to possess skills in areas such
as emotional intelligence, team work, project management, negotiation and diplomacy.
Third party 
Although civil society players such as NGOs have played roles in self-regulation, we
advocate an even greater role. As such, managers will need to develop and nurture
relationships with stakeholders outside the typical categories such as employees,
vendors, customers and government. In essence, this is a decided increase in the number
of stakeholders that firms must consider and work with. 
Patience
As with any change management process, managers must develop a sense of patience
about self-regulation. By involving a greater number of organisations in standards
development and management, the process will take longer. Further, managers need to
develop a sense that self-regulation is a process, not a destination. Many managers
familiar with Six Sigma or Kaizen activities have already developed a process orientation.
To improve the effectiveness of self-regulation, these managers need to extend their
process orientation into the field of self-regulation. 
Box 1 key issues for managers 
jcc35lad.qxd  3/12/09  12:56  Page 77
Our current regulatory systems are mostly country-specific and designed in a more
mechanical, top-down and command-and-control fashion. The challenge is to stand on
the shoulders of that system, and to deploy new mechanisms that reflect the emerging
reality of the global marketplace. As with strategic alliances, joint ventures and other
collaborative processes, regulatory cooperation is the result of recognised interdepen-
dence. 
Proposals for regulatory reform such as administrative rule changes, sunset laws1
and paperwork reductions only hint at future needs. Work suggested by Gray (1989) in
regulatory negotiation, Senge (1989) in prototype alliances, Keidel (1995) in new organ-
isation models, Lad (1991) in self-regulatory structures and Breyer (1982) in legislative
review and agency ‘high noon’,2 offer alternatives directed at specific regulatory domains.
It will require commitment to organisational learning, witnessing of mistakes in some
prototypes (Senge 1989) and openness to other points of view. 
Traditionally, regulatory policy has highlighted the distinctions between the roles of
government and industry decision-makers. Consistent with Preston’s (1986) concept of
‘meta-regulation’, Boddewyn’s (1989) idea of private government as agents of public pol-
icy, and Preston and Windsor’s (1992) notion of policy regimes, this discussion sug-
gests that, in the standards-setting area, the government’s responsibility may be best
served by encouraging and supporting the development of industry-based standards
groups and self-regulatory associations. Part of this responsibility, however, requires the
willingness of the government agencies to re-examine their roles. 
Government will need to engage in collaborative activities such as ongoing discus-
sions and ‘coaching’ the self-regulatory group to ensure that the system it develops com-
plies with appropriate laws and controls. As Gray (1989) notes, the collaboration
processes will challenge the legitimacy of traditionally accepted mechanisms for social
integration such as central planning and litigation. As central planning wanes, more
stakeholders are expressing a voice in the process. Industry policy-makers need to recog-
nise that taking on responsibility for a self-regulation system requires an ongoing, long-
term commitment to win–win collaboration with government agencies and their
member organisations. 
Although we hope that managers can already identify some of the ramifications of a
greater role for civil society players in self-regulation, we will be more explicit. Box 1,
while not exhaustive, captures the significant issues that managers might consider. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of the paper was to examine the regulation of business behaviour in a com-
plex global economy. It linked work on collaboration with the notion of control and reg-
ulation. Various examples of collaborative control were identified and examples of
self-regulation were used to illustrate how the process happens. Suggestions were
offered on how collaboration is necessary for future regulatory issues. 
The regulatory policy arena is a major centre of business–government interaction.
As regulatory issues move into domains of industry expertise, such as biotechnology
and securities trading, the controversy over appropriate means that meet the desired ends
of regulation must be reframed as a collaborative control process. With appropriate safe-
guards and proper planning, self-regulation and collaborative regulation may be alter-
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marketplace inefficiencies. It was one of many techniques used to hold agencies accountable.
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natives worth acknowledging and supporting. While neither is a panacea for address-
ing all forms of unwanted behaviour, nor a call for a laissez-faire government policy, col-
laborative dialogue can be useful in improving product standards and codes of conduct,
and in addressing issues of safety and performance in newly emerging industries and
professional specialities. The call for the use of ethical principles and dialogue is an
essential mechanism in the emerging, organic view of organisations, and in their inter-
organisational networks (Calton 1999). Because of complexity, the systems need to
become more self-organising, adaptive and responsive. Capra (1996) describes a process
called ‘autopoiesis’ where committed individuals can create a more dynamic system
from within the existing structure. We believe this is an apt description of how associ-
ations, professional societies, new civil institutions and other entities committed to col-
laboration continue to emerge as pivotal players in self-regulation. 
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